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Abstract 
When actors deem technological change undesirable, they may act symbolically by pretending to 
comply while avoiding real change. In our study of the introduction of an algorithmic technology in a 
sales organization, we found that such symbolic conformity led unintendedly to the full 
implementation of the suggested technological change. To explain this surprising outcome we 
advance a regime-of-knowing lens that helps to analyze deep challenges happening ‘under the 
surface’ during the process of technology introduction. A regime of knowing guides what is worth 
knowing, what actions matter to acquire this knowledge, and who has the authority to make decisions 
around those issues. We found that both the technologists who introduced the algorithmic technology, 
as well as the incumbent workers whose work was affected by the change, used symbolic actions to 
either defend the established regime of knowing or to advocate a radical change. While the incumbent 
workers enacted symbolic conformity by pretending to comply with suggested changes, the 
technologists performed symbolic advocacy by presenting a positive side of the technological change. 
Ironically, because the symbolic conformity enabled and was reinforced by symbolic advocacy, 
reinforcing cycles of symbolic actions yielded a radical change in the sales' regime of knowing: from 
one focused on a deep understanding of customers via personal contact and strong relationships, to 
one based upon model predictions from the processing of large datasets. We discuss the theoretical 




 The process of introducing a new technology in the workplace creates new possibilities for 
ways of working and organizing. Yet, the introduction of a new technology becomes problematic if it 
threatens workers’ practices, for instance by substituting existing ways of knowing with novel ones or 
replacing and devaluing the skills of incumbent workers (e.g., Bailey and Leonardi 2015; Barrett, 
Oborn, Orlikowski and Yates 2012; Noble 1984; Zuboff 1988). In such cases, workers are likely to 
question the superiority of the ways of working associated with the new technology and resist its 
implementation (Anthony 2018; Bailey and Barley 2011; Markus 1983). Instead of outright 
resistance, sometimes workers employ covert ways of resisting the implementation and adopt the new 
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technology symbolically, by pretending or suggesting that they use it without actually doing so 
(Berente and Yoo 2012; Hewlin 2003). 
 Although the literature treats symbolic conformity as a tactic that workers may use to avoid 
real change (Hallett 2010; Oliver 1991), we observed that symbolic conformity can lead, 
unintendedly, to the full implementation of the suggested technological change. In our study of the 
introduction of an algorithmic technology in the sales department of a telecommunications 
organization, account managers avoided using the introduced technology as it was associated with 
ways of knowing that were orthogonal to how they constructed and used knowledge. They resorted to 
symbolic conformity by pretending to use the technology for identifying sales opportunities. 
However, their symbolic conformity significantly contributed to making the technology appear 
effective in the eyes of management. This led to a full implementation of the technology, which 
eventually led to rendering the account managers redundant. Thus, whereas symbolic conformity is 
generally viewed as a safety valve to maintain actors’ idiosyncratic ways of working, in our study we 
saw that symbolic conformity had detrimental consequences for the very actors who performed it.  
To explain this empirical surprise, we suggest that symbolic actions may, inadvertently, result 
in a radical change of the regime of knowing in the workplace. A regime of knowing comprises the 
specific knowing practices through which actors develop and use knowledge; the valuation schemes 
through which actions, people and things are evaluated; and the authority arrangements that determine 
which actors have control over how the work is performed in certain tasks. We suggest that a regime-
of-knowing lens is useful to understand the contestation that unfolds during technological change. 
New technologies are often associated with ways of knowing that challenge how the incumbent 
workers construct and use knowledge (Galison 1997; Knorr-Cetina 1999). Knowing practices are 
deeply entwined with the value that is attached to knowledge and the means of production thereof 
(Dussauge, Helgesson, Lee and Woolgar 2015). Thus, changing existing knowing practices often 
incites a dispute over which values matter the most in a work domain (Howard-Grenville and Carlile 
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2006; Nicolini 2012; Thévenot 2001). Often, struggles over the appropriateness of knowing practices 
also involve hidden battles over who controls the way in which work is done and who has the 
authority to push such changes through (Galison 1997; Hilgartner 2017; Knorr-Cetina 1999). 
Our longitudinal qualitative study of how data analytics technology got implemented in the 
business-to-business sales function of a telecommunications organization, documented changes in the 
regime of knowing that were triggered by symbolic action. The regime of knowing originally guided 
focus on in-depth knowledge of customers via personal contacts and strong personal relationships. 
The transformed regime of knowing emphasized identifying customer needs based on data-analytic 
predictions, derived from the processing of large, historical datasets, and involved data scientists who 
were unfamiliar with the process of sales. The struggle between the sales account managers and the 
data scientists brought incommensurate views to the surface concerning the appropriateness of 
different knowing practices. This struggle often took place behind the scenes, through symbolic 
actions. The incumbent sales workers enacted symbolic conformity, by pretending to comply with the 
suggested changes. Similarly, the data scientists enacted symbolic advocacy, by hiding the account 
managers’ limited use of the data-enabled ways and proclaiming the new approach as a great success. 
Those symbolic actions unintentionally reinforced each other, thereby ironically accelerating the pace 
of change in the sales’ regime of knowing. 
This study contributes to the literature on technology and organizing by advancing a regime-
of-knowing lens for studying technology introduction in the workplace. This perspective helps see 
below the surface of struggles over changing established practices. The regime-of-knowing lens shifts 
attention to the deeper challenges that actors are faced with, such as disputing what is worth knowing, 
what actions matter to acquire this knowledge, and who has the authority to make decisions around 
those issues. By approaching knowing practices as entwined with valuation schemes and authority 
arrangements, the regime-of-knowing lens helps understand why symbolic actions meant to defend 
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and maintain knowing practices may have unintended consequences for the actors who perform them, 
and thus can reinforce rather than avoid change.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The process of introducing a new technology in the workplace often results in changes in the 
nature of work and organizing (Leonardi and Barley 2010; Zammuto et al. 2007). Such transformation 
can be associated with struggles concerning who gains control over organizational processes and how 
work is performed (Noble 1984; Zuboff 1988). For example, digital technologies offer the possibility 
of transforming activities and redefining existing roles, work boundaries and authority in ways that go 
to the core of a work practice (Bailey, Leonardi and Barley 2012; Barley 1986; Barrett et al. 2012). 
Existing skills and expertise that are often tightly entwined with a work practice can be rendered 
obsolete by the resultant work changes (Christin 2017; Ehn 1988). Thus, it is not surprising that 
technologies that afford radical work changes are often misaligned with actors’ existing expertise and 
ways of working, and are likely to be treated with skepticism (Anthony 2018; Bailey and Barley 
2011), or even resisted (Alvesson 2004; Lapointe and Rivard 2007). 
Given that knowing is at the heart of work practices, the introduction of a new technology in a 
work domain has consequences on how actors construct and use knowledge (Carlile 2002; Knorr-
Cetina 1999; Orlikowski 2002). Sometimes, technologies may automate tedious and repetitive tasks 
that actors often consider to be the “unskilled” part of their work. In such cases, the changes that 
technologies bring about in work practices are welcomed by most users (Leonardi 2013; Newell et al. 
2009; Zammuto et al. 2007). In other situations, however, technology is associated with radical 
reconfiguration of the existing knowing practices through which actors come to know what they need 
to know to perform their work (Bailey and Leonardi 2015; Kraemer et al. 1987). For example, the 
introduction of computerized information systems in paper mills has led to radical changes in 
operators’ knowing of the production process, moving from direct sensory immersion with materials 
and machines, to relying on information displayed by digital technologies (Vallas and Beck 1996; 
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Zuboff 1988). The introduction of technology may even lead to a complete substitution of existing 
knowing practices with new ones, by automating work tasks and deskilling work originally performed 
by a group of experts (Noble 1984; Bailey and Leonardi 2015; Zuboff 1988). When the technology is 
associated with drastic reconfiguration or even complete substitution of the existing knowing 
practices, actors may engage in fierce struggles.  
To explain how such struggles unfold and lead to radical changes in knowing practices, in the 
next section we advance the regime-of-knowing lens. 
Regimes of knowing 
The term regime is often used in various contexts in the social sciences to refer to an 
arrangement that provides a framework for guiding action and imposes “order on a domain or activity, 
typically through some combination of formal rules, informal norms, material means, and discursive 
framings” (Hilgartner 2017: 8). In political science the notion of regime is used to abstract essential 
social, institutional, and legal arrangements. Similarly, ‘regime’ has been adopted to describe the 
corpus of knowledge, techniques, and scientific discourses that historically constitute what society 
recognizes as truth (Foucault 1975). In science and technology studies, the concept of regime has 
been deployed to refer to the arrangement of norms, rules, and procedures that guide policy making 
(Jasanoff 2004), or the inherent assumptions, organizing principles, and patent ways to interpret data 
that constitute scientific work (Galison 1997). Regimes are consequential, by subtly shaping what, in 
retrospect, appear to be the natural ways to approach scientific inquiry. For example, the emergence 
of a regime of regulatory objectivity, predicated on the absence of an expert’s interpretation, has 
increasingly led to systematic reliance on quantitative approaches (Cambrosio, Keating, Schlich and 
Weisz 2006; Daston and Galison 2007). The notion of regime brings into focus the constructed and 
contested nature of ways of knowing, what counts as valuable knowledge, who has a say in how work 
is organized, and how power issues permeate this construction.  
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In organizations where a work environment is reasonably stable, an accepted and seemingly 
natural way of working and organizing emerges (Nicolini 2012). Actors tend to unreflectively 
embrace and inhabit a regime of knowing. A regime of knowing offers socially sanctioned 
conventions about what counts as valuable knowledge, about what actions are appropriate, and about 
authority arrangements. Thus, a regime of knowing guides what constitutes skillful performance, what 
tools to master, and how to approach problem solving in the workplace. Applying a regime lens to 
knowledge work is useful in order to represent the “‘relevant realities’ in which practices are 
embedded and the social devices that govern our ways of engaging with and articulating the world 
around us” (Howard-Grenville and Carlile 2006: 474). We argue that a regime-of-knowing lens is 
also useful to understand how work practices evolve when new modes of knowing enter the 
workplace. Three aspects of a regime of knowing can be distinguished: (1) the knowing practices that 
shape how actors develop and use knowledge in a specific work domain; (2) the valuation scheme that 
is used for evaluating performance, actions, people, objects, and ideas; and (3) authority arrangements 
that offer socially-sanctioned ways to structure collective activity, to organize work, and to coordinate 
tasks to ensure a skilled performance. As illustrated in Figure 1 and explained in the following 
paragraphs, these three aspects are strongly interlinked with each other. 
******** Insert Figure 1 about here ********* 
Regimes of knowing are instantiated through knowing practices. By knowing practices we 
refer to the situated activities through which actors come to know what they need to know to 
proficiently perform their work. Knowing how to act in particular circumstances is inextricably 
related to the actions that people perform (Schatzki 2001). For example, lawyers come to know how 
to set up their client’s defense strategy not only based on their ability to recite the law. Rather, their 
knowing emerges through the practices of collecting and assessing evidence of their client’s case, the 
interactions with the judge and jury, and other recurrent activities that they perform in their everyday 
work. Actors who work under the same regime of knowing perform similar knowing practices. 
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Therefore, they tend to pay attention to similar objects and types of information, and share distinct 
methods for generating knowledge claims (Bechky 2003; Carlile 200l; Knorr-Cetina 1999). Knowing 
practices are constituted by the technology and tools used by the actors in their work, which 
fundamentally shape how actors conceive the world and produce knowledge (Orlikowski 2006).  
Knowing practices are intertwined with specific valuation schemes that orient actors to what 
is worth knowing and what is proper action to produce valuable knowledge. Thus, valuation schemes 
determine what kind of information matters and what methods are important to acquire value from 
this information (Dussauge et al. 2015; Thévenot 2001). Actors who engage in the same practice, 
share an evaluative orientation towards what is considered a good way of acting, or knowing what is 
right or wrong (MacIntyre 1981; Nicolini 2012). Actors draw upon these collective preferences and 
orientations to justify their beliefs and actions, as well as to convince others about what is a legitimate 
course of action in a particular situation (Cloutier and Langley 2013; Patriotta, Gond and Schultz 
2011). Valuation schemes not only affect knowing practices, but they can also be shaped by them. For 
example, the emergence of TripAdvisor technology for sharing information about hotels has led to a 
shift in the valuation of hotels, from expert ratings by professional reviewers, to evaluations based on 
the online reviews offered by guests (Orlikowski and Scott 2014). Valuation schemes also help 
determine whose knowledge matters most and, thus, which roles are rendered important in the 
workplace.  
Both knowing practices and valuation schemes are also deeply entwined with the existing 
authority arrangements, as powerful actors or those in authority can decide what is worth knowing, 
and what this knowledge is worth. Therefore, regimes of knowing are also constituted through 
authority arrangements. Authority arrangements refer to socially sanctioned ways to organize, 
affording power to actors whose expertise is highly valued, to impact how they and others engage in 
the work (Bourgoin, Bencherki and Faraj 2019). Authority arrangements are fundamentally shaped by 
existing valuation schemes, as these are used to evaluate actors and their actions, thereby determining 
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which actors have the right skills and expertise to control task performance (Abbott 1988; Galison 
1997). By providing a shared understanding of how power is distributed in the workplace and which 
actors have the authority to determine how work should be done, authority arrangements can also 
deeply affect what is rendered as valuable knowledge, and which knowing practices are accepted to 
produce it.  
Technology introduction and struggles over a regime of knowing 
The process of introducing a new technology in a work domain is often associated with 
changes in the established regime of knowing (Introna 2016; Monteiro and Parmiggiani 2019; 
Orlikowski 2006). When new technologies become available, offering the promise of a different and 
potentially cheaper or more efficient way of working, actors face decisions on how to react. Often the 
new technology triggers actors to rethink their current ways of working and skill sets, and can trigger 
apprehension for the incumbent workers whose work is affected by the technological change. It 
becomes especially challenging for the incumbent workers if the technology is associated with ways 
of working that require changes in the intertwined knowing practices, valuation schemes, and 
authority arrangements that make up the current regime of knowing. For example, in the field of 
strategy, one consequence of the shift toward Powerpoint-based presentations was that presentations 
became more linear, resulting in the simplification of complex and conflicting ideas, the 
backgrounding of situational data, and the subtle skewing of results to support personal agendas 
(Kaplan 2011).  
Not surprisingly, actors can perceive a major shift in the regime of knowing as both an 
opportunity and a threat. It may lead to struggles between those actors who favor changes in the 
regime and those who have become attached to the established knowing practices and beliefs about 
knowing (Fayard et al. 2016; Howard-Grenville and Carlile 2006). Thus, struggles over a regime of 
knowing are often political, as actors compete to maintain or establish their authority over how work 
is performed and strive to impose their own valuation scheme and knowing practices. Such a struggle 
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of political nature occurred, for instance, during the nineteen eighties, with the arrival of 
computational models in the public policy arena. Modeling transpired to be a non-neutral addition to 
bureaucratic infighting and a way to shape and win policy debates (King and Kraemer 1993; Kraemer 
et al. 1987). Differences in what we call regimes of knowing shaped how computer modeling tools 
were enrolled in policy making. In the US, models were rapidly adopted, not for providing an innately 
superior way of working, but because they could be “weaponized” in the bureaucratic struggles within 
and across government agencies. By comparison, in Germany, government policy was traditionally 
reliant on long-established and independent central bureaucratic entities that took pride in their own 
internal processes and expertise in supporting policies. As a result, these same computer models only 
saw limited adoption. 
How incumbent workers respond to the challenge of technology-related changes often hinges 
on their professional authority and relative power within their organization. Actors with high authority 
are more able to defend their skills and expertise by rejecting the new technology (Lapointe and 
Rivard 2007), or are able to control how change in the knowing practices will take place (Anthony 
2018; Bailey and Barley 2011; Barley 1986). For example, structural engineers (Bailey, Leonardi and 
Chong 2010) and fire engineers (Dodgson, Gann, and Salter 2007), faced with the digitization of their 
work practices, agreed to most changes, but used their authority to disallow any automation of their 
engineering judgment and continued to use their traditional hand calculations. Actors who lack the 
authority to reject the changes are still able to avoid them by enacting evasive maneuvers. For 
example, they may perform ‘workarounds’, in other words, use the features of the technology in ways 
that deviate from the designers’ intentions (Azad and King 2008; Boudreau and Robey 2005; 
Leonardi 2011). Alternatively, actors may only loosely couple their existing practices with the new 
technology-enabled practices, to deal with the inconsistencies between their existing work practices 
and the newly introduced technology, thereby allowing them to continue with their work practices 
(Berente and Yoo 2012; Berente, Lyytinen, Yoo and King 2016; Christin 2017). Finally, actors may 
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choose to conceal their non-compliance and engage in symbolic conformity, by pretending to adopt 
the new practices. Symbolic conformity is not intended to make a system work. It is rather a tactic for 
avoiding real use of the introduced practices and the values and assumptions associated with them 
(Hewlin 2003; Oliver 1991; Zbaracki 1998). 
Often new technologies are accompanied by groups of technologists who are trained in their 
workings, believe in the promise that the technology represents a superior way of doing, and assume 
the role of advocates and promoters of the possibilities offered by the technology (Barley 1986; 
Kraemer et al. 1987). This may result in a wedge being driven between the incumbent workers 
affected by the technological change yet steeped in the existing ways of working, and the 
technologists, who are eager to transform those ways. If their proposed changes and reorganizations 
of work appear risky and politically uncertain, technologists may resort to symbolic advocacy. 
Symbolic advocacy is advocacy performed via symbolic actions that aim to attribute meaning beyond 
their substantive effect and that may be “deliberately employed in order to direct attention away from 
certain facts and towards others in order to protect sectional interests, gain resources and maintain or 
restructure institutional patterns of power and deference” (Brown 1994, p.863). Technologists may 
specifically foreground the positive or performance-enhancing aspects of the associated changes and 
emphasize the potential effectiveness of the new way of working, while keeping the eventual impact 
on incumbent workers in the shadows (Brown 1995; Fiss and Zajac 2006; Noble 1984; Zuboff 2019). 
Thus, symbolic advocacy can be an effective tactic in order to gain legitimacy and support from 
management and other stakeholders. 
In sum, struggles arise when technologists introduce a technology that is associated with 
radically different ways of knowing, as both the technologists and the incumbent workers whose work 
is affected by the technological change have different stakes in the stability or evolution of the regime 
of knowing. In the next section we report on our field study, which focused on how technologists and 
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incumbent workers engaged in a contest, often at the symbolic level, about which knowing practices 
were appropriate to serve corporate customers. 
RESEARCH SETTING 
Regimes of knowing become visible at moments of radical change, such as with the 
introduction of a technology that is associated with radically different knowing practices compared to 
those already established in the workplace. Significant moments of change may cause controversies 
and temporary breakdowns of everyday practices. Controversies and breakdowns trigger reflection by 
actors, who become aware of differences, focus on the things that matter to their own practice, and 
articulate their different perspectives in their effort to make the world comprehensible to themselves 
and to other members of the community (Nicolini 2012; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). At moments of 
controversy, power dynamics are reshuffled and actors articulate how they know what they know, 
what is considered a good way of acting, and who has authority to say how things should be done. 
During the controversy that unfolded with the introduction of data analytics technology in TelCo’s 
Sales Medium department, the regime of knowing and how it evolved became visible to the authors.  
TelCo is a large organization (about 16,000 employees) offering telecommunication services 
to a broad range of customers. Our research focus was on the business-to-business sales department 
that targeted medium-sized enterprises, known as Sales Medium. The department employed over 100 
account managers, divided into ten sales teams, geographically dispersed around the country. During 
a 24-month field study of TelCo (March 2013 - March 2015), we observed the changes associated 
with the introduction of data analytics technology to support sales activities. By representing 
knowledge as an outcome of algorithmic transformations of decontextualized, digitized, and 
quantified information, data analytics was associated with radically different knowing practices 
compared to the existing practices in the sales function. Before the introduction of data analytics, 
sales relied predominantly on human agents and their personal relations with customers. 
All Sales Medium account managers were assigned a set of 250-300 customers with whom 
they built a relationship over several years. Account managers kept in frequent contact with their 
customers, in order to identify sales opportunities and to generate ‘leads’ for offering telecom and ICT 
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services. A lead indicated that a customer had expressed interest in a product and wanted to receive an 
offer for a specific portfolio. Account managers described their work as “farming”: through the 
careful tending of personal relationships and keeping track of corporate developments (e.g. the 
opening of new offices), they were able to identify new sales opportunities in a timely manner. They 
enjoyed multifaceted interactions with their contacts, through frequent lunches, taking them to 
sporting events, and even keeping track of their family and personal lives. The typical account 
manager held a vocational (non-university) degree focused on business or sales. 
The separate Customer Intelligence department employed a group of data scientists, whose 
job it was to focus on data analytics techniques. They acted as the champions of data analytics and 
extolled its potential to revolutionize the operations of both marketing and sales. While they had no 
formal authority over the sales department, they developed a data analytics sales tool, labeled the 
Customer Lifecycle Management (CLM) model. Based on predictive modeling and optimization 
algorithms, the CLM model extracted actionable insights from historical and population-wide data 
about TelCo’s customers and their transactions.  
The CLM model was associated with knowing practices to identify sales opportunities that 
were radically different from existing practices. The model combined a number of internal and 
external data sources, such as time series of customer transactions, Nielsen market data, Gartner ICT 
spending predictions, financial data, and usage data. The output of the model was represented in a 
spreadsheet format that contained a list of all medium-sized customers and predictions regarding 
potential sales opportunities. The CLM model allocated customers to different customer segments (A, 
B, C, D) based on their historical and predicted sales with TelCo. For each TelCo product line (e.g. 
PABX switches, mobile phone packages, fixed line setups, etc.), the CLM model assigned a position 
in the customer sales lifecycle (inform, specify, sell, maintain), each of which entailed a different 
contact strategy. Thus the model output consisted of a ranking of opportunities, with a prioritized 
action list for account managers. 
All data scientists held higher education degrees (most often at masters’ level) in engineering 
or econometrics. Their training also included additional specialized courses in data analytics, certified 
by a well-established institute of market intelligence and analytics. Many of them had been seconded 
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to other companies that were leaders in applying data analytics to their operations. The data scientists 
viewed themselves as internal consultants, offering the benefit of their advanced training and 
techniques to improve the operations of “internal customers”, such as marketers, campaign managers, 
and product managers.  
In January 2012, the data scientists proposed the CLM model as a way to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Sales Medium sales process. At first, the data scientists tried to 
collaborate with the account managers, who were avoiding using the CLM model due to their 
reservations about the way it generated its recommendations. The account managers quickly resorted 
to feigning usage and kept to their old ways of working. However, in February 2014, company 
management were swayed by the developers of the CLM model and decided to reorganize sales into a 
more efficient way of working. As a result, the account managers were unceremoniously dismissed 
and the sales function became the responsibility of the data scientists. These events marked a drastic 
reconfiguration of the regime of knowing in Sales Medium, as outlined in Table 1. Prior to the 
introduction of the CLM model, the Sales Medium regime of knowing highly valued the maintenance 
of personal and trustworthy relationships with customers, and was focused on knowing customers via 
personal contacts, using account managers’ gut feelings to identify sales opportunities. Due to their 
unique position in managing customer relations, the account managers had the authority to control the 
sales process. However, by the end of 2014, the regime of knowing in Sales Medium was radically 
different. Acting rationally and efficiently was valued as being more important than fostering 
customer relationships. Sales opportunities were identified based on predictions calculated by 
processing large population-wide and historical datasets. As they were responsible for developing 
analytical insights, the data scientists gained authority over this task, taking control over which 
customers should be called, when, and about which portfolio offers.  
******** Insert Table 1 about here *********  
DATA AND METHODS 
 The sources of evidence we used included ethnographic observations, interviews, and 
documentation. The first author spent 24 months (starting from March 2013) at TelCo as a passive 
participant, observing the work and interactions of both account managers and data scientists 
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(Spradley 1980). By shadowing different account managers for a whole working day at a time, she 
observed how they worked, planned their everyday work, contacted their customers, and used the 
CLM model. She kept detailed notes about the actions of the account managers, including how they 
used various information systems in their work. Additionally, she engaged in informal discussions 
with them during their lunch breaks. The account managers were always very talkative and would 
often turn to the researcher and explain to her what they had been doing on their computers or what 
they had been discussing with a contact on the phone. Similarly, the first author also shadowed the 
data scientists, specifically those involved in the construction of the CLM model. She observed, for 
instance, how they worked while preparing queries and algorithms for the CLM model, and attended 
their meetings with other stakeholders to discuss the development of models. The shadowing 
experience with the data scientists was different from the shadowing of account managers. The data 
scientists remained focused on developing their code and would talk only if the researcher asked them 
specific questions. While explaining the algorithms they were developing, the data scientists would 
also explain their views on the CLM model; the knowing practices that they viewed as important for 
the sales function; the valuation scheme that mattered to them; and the authority arrangements that 
they considered ideal in Sales Medium. Field notes were complemented with photos of the 
participants in action and of their workspaces. Shadowing was often followed by an interview, to gain 
more insight into informants’ subjective perspectives.  
Another type of observation involved meetings, which shed light on the micro-dynamics of 
interactions (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011) between organizational members. In particular, the first 
author, together with one of the other researchers, observed two types of meetings: First, kick-off 
presentations that were held on a quarterly basis and constituted the main occasions for the two 
groups to meet face-to-face. In these presentations, the data scientists put forward new versions of the 
CLM model, and a marketing manager unveiled new campaigns that were running in that quarter. 
Furthermore, the first author also observed some of the weekly Customer Intelligence team meetings, 
in which the data scientists would discuss updates on their analytics projects and their plans for future 
projects. She regularly forwarded her field notes to the other authors for discussion and collective 
sensemaking. 
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Semi-structured interviews with data scientists, account managers, sales team managers, and 
other roles constituted another important source of evidence (Weiss 1995). The interviews were 
conducted by the first author. Following each interview, she wrote up a research diary entry and 
shared her memos with the rest of the team, to discuss insights, look for emerging themes, and 
consider what to prioritize in subsequent interviews. The interviews focused on individuals’ work 
practices and their views of the CLM model. During these sessions, interviewees described how they 
dealt with the challenges they faced and explained the rationale behind their actions. They also 
elaborated on their views about how work should be performed, what kind of knowledge mattered, 
and why the CLM model was or was not useful. We often asked participants to bring their laptops to 
the interviews, or requested to spend some time with them at their desks, so that they could show us in 
detail how they made plans and how they prepared for contact with customers. Because we entered 
the field about one year after the CLM model had been first presented to Sales Medium, parts of the 
interviews referred to what had happened in the previous year. Different interview guides were 
prepared for each type of informant (account manager, data scientist, director, etc.). Over time, those 
interview guides were adjusted following specific events (e.g. the announcement of layoffs), and 
became more focused (e.g. specific questions asking why actors performed a specific action once that 
action was identified). Each interview guide was also slightly adjusted if it was conducted after 
having shadowed the informant at work. The interviews took place throughout the duration of the 
study, until all the account managers were laid off. We also undertook a few complementary 
interviews one year after the fieldwork, to follow up how things had evolved in TelCo since then. All 
interviews were recorded, transcribed, and shared between the authors, to ensure common 
understanding of the data. 
Finally, a variety of documents were used in order to triangulate information from the 
interviews and, in particular, to verify any retrospective information. We used public documents (such 
as press releases and TelCo annual reports), news items, PowerPoint presentations (mainly from the 
kick-offs), and Excel sheets that included the variables (and descriptions of those variables) included 
in the CLM model. An overview of all collected data is provided in Table 2. 
******** Insert Table 2 about here ********* 
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Data analysis 
Due to the processual nature of our research question, we followed a process research 
approach (Langley 1999), to track the flow of events and to understand why things unfolded in a 
particular way. The complexity of the data and the variability of their temporal embeddedness led us 
to employ a multitude of strategies. 
First, we constructed a case narrative. The case narrative is a useful strategy to enrich 
understanding of a phenomenon, as it includes contextual details that capture the richness and 
complexity of the setting (Langley 1999). We created an event list (Poole et al. 2000) to maintain our 
chain of evidence and identify patterns, and we used this as a scaffold while alternating between the 
different sensemaking strategies and literature. Using the event list, we constructed a detailed story 
from the raw data that helped us construct the chronology of events, identify linkages and patterns 
between different types of events, and find emerging themes (Pettigrew 1990). Using quotes from the 
interview transcripts, the case narrative voiced the perspectives of the data scientists, account 
managers, sales team managers, the campaign manager, and higher management. The narrative was 
further enriched with observations captured in the field notes and evidence from the additional 
documents. Fictional names were used to enhance the readability of the story without compromising 
the anonymity of informants. As we identified important events that signaled change (e.g. decisions 
from higher management), we used temporal bracketing to structure the narrative into three periods.  
Second, we employed the strategy of thematic coding. During the fieldwork we had already 
performed inductive coding, in order to track the different work practices of the data scientists and the 
account managers; their different views over sales work; their interaction with the algorithmic 
technology (CLM model); and the actions that they performed to deal with their struggle. The 
construction of the narrative helped us shift to thematic coding, which included several iterations after 
reading the literature on technology implementation and knowing in practice. The theme of regime of 
knowing emerged as important, since the struggle between the account managers and data scientists 
concentrated on three interrelated aspects: the knowing practices that were performed to find sales 
opportunities; the valuation scheme that guided what good sales work entailed; and the authority 
arrangements that determined which actors controlled how the sales work was done. As the 
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participants articulated their views on knowing practices, valuation schemes, and authority 
arrangements while in conversation with each other or with the authors, we were able to track what 
the regime of knowing in Sales Medium was like before the introduction of the CLM model and how 
it came to be eventually, after it was re-stabilized with the reorganization of Sales Medium. We 
provide this comparison in Table 1. 
Third, we performed further thematic coding while tracking the actions that different actors 
performed as they engaged over the three aspects of the regime of knowing in Sales Medium. We 
found that many of these actions were performed symbolically. Those symbolic actions were further 
refined into symbolic conformity, performed by the account managers to appear as if they were 
conforming to the changes while trying to defend their knowing practices; and symbolic advocacy, 
performed by the data scientists to gain authority and establish the knowing practices and valuation 
scheme associated with the CLM model, by obscuring the unfolding changes associated with the 
technology and only presenting their positive side.  
Fourth, we performed process analysis. We returned to the case narrative and the event list to 
develop a process explanation. We compared the various actions performed by each group of actors, 
and traced how these had consequences for other actions. We coded each action for whether or not it 
concerned a type of symbolic action, the nature of the symbolic action if applicable (symbolic 
conformity or symbolic advocacy), and which part of the regime it engaged with (e.g. whether the 
action was meant to defend the knowing practices). We traced the consequences of the symbolic 
actions to theorize about their impact on the change process. We also found it important to trace the 
consequences of actions that were not symbolic, but which had been triggered by former symbolic 
actions. The impact of those actions alone was not sufficient to change the regime of knowing, but 
those actions enabled later symbolic actions to occur and thus, indirectly, had an effect on the regime 
change. Finally, we analyzed how each action or set of actions impacted the regime of knowing. This 
comparison is summarized in Tables 3,4 and 6. This process analysis helped us theorize about why 
people interact via symbolic actions and how such symbolic actions enable change in the regime of 
knowing. 
 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANALYTICS IN TELCO SALES MEDIUM 
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In this section we analyze how the struggle over incommensurate ways of knowing unfolded 
after the introduction of the CLM model in Sales Medium and how it led to a radical change in the 
regime of knowing. During the struggle, both the account managers and the data scientists performed 
various symbolic actions in their efforts to affect the knowing practices, valuation schemes, and 
authority arrangements. As we will show in the sub-sections that follow, those symbolic actions had 
consequences for the evolution of the regime of knowing. Based on the findings that we report, we 
have developed a process model of change of a regime of knowing through symbolic actions (see 
Figure 2). Even though the main concepts and process model have been inductively developed, we 
present them in advance to help readers understand the theoretical significance of dynamics in the 
case history (Berends and Deken 2019). As we explain later, our model captures the changes of the 
regime of knowing in each of the three time periods of our narrative. 
******** Insert Figure 2 about here ********* 
Our model depicts incumbent workers (in our case the account managers) and technologists 
(in our case the data scientists) enacting distinct sets of symbolic actions: The account managers 
enacted symbolic conformity by merely appearing to conform to the suggested changes, in their effort 
to defend their existing knowing practices. The data scientists enacted symbolic advocacy by 
obscuring the unfolding changes associated with the technology and only presenting their positive 
side, in their efforts to gain authority and change the accepted knowing practices and valuation 
scheme. As we will show, the account managers’ actions of symbolic conformity enabled the data 
scientists to enact symbolic advocacy that, in turn, reinforced further symbolic conformity by the 
incumbent workers. This mutual reinforcement between symbolic conformity and symbolic advocacy 
became a mechanism for the transformation of the regime of knowing, because the three aspects of a 
regime of knowing (knowing practices, valuation scheme, authority arrangements) were intertwined 
such that change in one aspect of the regime eventually led to changes in the other two. This is 
depicted by the bidirectional arrows connecting the three aspects of a regime of knowing in Figure 2.  
We structure the remainder of this section into three sub-sections, representing the three 
periods of the narrative. In presenting the findings, we explain how the interactions modeled in our 
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process model in Figure 2 are instantiated in each of the three periods, leading to gradual changes of 
the regime of knowing in the Sales Medium function at TelCo. 
Period of attempted collaboration 
In the first period, the CLM team made various attempts to bridge the differences between 
them and the sales team and collaborate with the account managers (see Table 3 for a summary of the 
actions and their impact on the regime of knowing in this period). In early 2012, the data scientists 
introduced the CLM model and its new way of approaching sales at an information session attended 
by the majority of the account managers. Contrary to the data scientists’ expectations, the account 
managers did not appear interested, nor did they engage any further: 
In the beginning, we first did a presentation for the Sales Medium about the model for all the 
teams together in one session. And then we introduced the model, and everybody was sitting 
there ‘OK, OK, maybe for others, but I don’t think I have to do it’ (data scientist). 
 
******** Insert Table 3 about here ********* 
To overcome the account managers’ lack of interest and to engage with them, the data 
scientists reached out to the campaign manager responsible for the campaigns that ran in Sales 
Medium. The campaign manager was liked by the sales teams and met with them on a regular basis. 
He wanted to improve the campaign management process and therefore supported the CLM model, 
encouraging the account managers to use it. Thus, by teaming up with the campaign manager, the data 
scientists ensured that they could gain direct access to the sales teams via regular meetings and had 
someone on the inside who would promote the CLM model to them. 
The account managers who participated in the meetings did not find the presentations by the 
data scientists useful. However, they only attended them so that they and their sales team manager 
appeared collaborative: 
I’ve seen these presentations four or five times... So, after two times I told my manager ‘very 
nice to be there, but it has no added value for us to be at the presentation’. Because the 
presentations are pretty much the same: ‘We’ve changed this, we’ve changed that, blah blah 
blah blah...’ This is it. But it’s politically good to be there. For my manager, to have his 
complete team there, and for us to show our faces. So we go… (account manager). 
 
Thus, the account managers symbolically conformed by attending the meetings with the data 
scientists, despite having no interest in the talks about the CLM model, and only attended to look 
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collaborative and stay informed about the latest campaigns. Nevertheless, this worked well for the 
data scientists, as they were now able to establish regular face-to-face contact with the account 
managers, thereby gaining a legitimate foothold in Sales Medium. By attending the joint meetings, the 
account managers could no longer simply ignore the data scientists and their alternative view of sales 
work. While the account managers may have engaged in the meetings primarily for symbolic reasons 
to appear collaborative, the net effect was that the data scientists became legitimate participants and 
were enabled to put forth a different valuation scheme and claim authority in the sales regime of 
knowing. 
The data scientists met with the sales teams twice each quarter: at kick-off meetings at the 
start of each quarter and at evaluation meetings one month later. In those meetings, the data scientists 
tried to demonstrate the value of the CLM model by emphasizing how the tool could support account 
managers in increasing their sales, while simultaneously trying to avoid making it look like a threat to 
the existing ways of working. This was a symbolic advocacy tactic by the data scientists: Even though 
they believed that the current way of working in sales was inefficient and aimed to change it, they 
carefully tried to mitigate the defensiveness of the account managers by framing the value of the 
model as a supportive tool, rather than a mandatory change in the way of working: 
A year ago I went to a presentation of the model with [the campaign manager], and they 
[account managers] were sitting there just like that [crosses her arms tightly] ‘Oh, I know my 
customers myself, why do I have to use the model… And it takes a lot of time for me…’ So it 
wasn’t a nice presentation! [chuckles] So that’s why we’ve got the model, but also a lot of 
massaging egos, just to try get the model accepted (data scientist). 
 
Such interactions forced the account managers to engage in conversations to explain why they 
valued talking to their customers and forming deep relationships with them. The two groups sparred 
over the nature of knowledge and the relevance of each other’s valuation scheme:  
Kelly [data scientist] explains how the model predicts the roaming [sales possibility]. One 
account manager jumps into the conversation ‘But remember, this is an indication. You have 
to feel them [the customers] when you are sitting with them at the table’. Kelly replies that her 
numbers are based on historical data (from field notes during kick-off meeting). 
 
The kick-off meetings led to significant interactions over the different knowing practices. The 
data scientists used these meetings to present the workings of the CLM model and used the evaluation 
meetings to obtain feedback from the account managers to understand how the CLM model could fit 
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in with the account managers’ way of working. The account managers provided some feedback on 
how to improve the tool and explained that they had tried using the CLM model, but did not trust its 
output. The account managers continued to avoid working with the CLM model: 
So, we received the CLM model once, and I opened it and I saw three faults in it, and I thought 
‘ah let’s not bother’, and closed it again. Yeah… useless… (account manager). 
 
To summarize, in this period the data scientists tried to collaborate with the account 
managers. To maintain their way of working while appearing collaborative, the account managers 
attended the meetings with the data scientists symbolically. This symbolic conformity, however, had 
an impact on the regime of knowing: the data scientists became legitimate participants in Sales 
Medium, which, consequently, affected the authority arrangements. The data scientists were then 
enabled to enact symbolic advocacy, by symbolically framing the technology as non-threatening and 
supportive. In this way, the data scientists pushed the use of the new technology as a valuable way of 
working and thus had an impact on the existing valuation scheme. Through these interactions, the 
CLM model came to be acknowledged in Sales Medium as a possible alternative way of finding sales 
opportunities, even though it did not (yet) affect the actual knowing practices. 
Period of limited mutual adjustment 
The period of attempted collaboration was followed by a period of limited mutual adjustment, 
in which the data scientists and the account managers appeared to accommodate their differences by 
adjusting their practices. However, those adjustments were rather minimal, or even just pretend (see 
Table 4 for a summary of the actions and their impact).  
******** Insert Table 4 about here ********* 
 In the second quarter of 2012, the data scientists started tracking the leads generated by the 
account managers, with the help of the CLM model. To address the account managers’ concerns, the 
data scientists wanted to prove that the tool was an effective way of working. Therefore, the data 
scientists asked the account managers to use a specific code in their sales support CRM system when 
registering leads generated with the use of the CLM model. As very few account managers used the 
CLM model, initially the numbers of leads registered by most sales teams were very low. However, 
there was one sales team that did start registering leads with the CLM code. Their manager, Kate, was 
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the only sales team manager who supported the CLM model upon its introduction. Driven by her 
ambition to lead a successful team, Kate encouraged her account managers to support the CLM 
model. However, often, Kate’s team members only symbolically registered leads with the CLM code, 
without actually having used the model: 
She [Kate] tells us to use it [the CLM model]... We always add the code [when registering the 
leads]... But when my colleague calls me and says ‘we have a client’, then I’ve found the sales 
opportunity from him and not from using the CLM model. But, still, I have to add the CLM 
code, even if the opportunity did not come from the CLM (account manager). 
 
This symbolic conformity was enacted by Kate’s account managers to defend their actual knowing 
practices, but it had unexpected material consequences. Even though the leads with the CLM code 
were registered for symbolic reasons, the CRM database started to accumulate data indicating that the 
model had been used. Thus, the symbolic conformity action aimed at defending the knowing practices 
had an impact on the valuation scheme, since there were data suggesting that the CLM model was a 
valuable way of working, at least for some. 
 This symbolic conformity also helped the data scientists, as they were able to extract these 
data and use them to argue that the CLM model worked and to convince the account managers to use 
it more often. More specifically, the data scientists started benchmarking the number of leads 
registered with the CLM code per team and presented this comparative analysis at the quarterly kick-
off meetings with the account managers. They presented Kate’s team as championing the CLM model 
and shared their “success story” with the other sales teams. However, the data scientists’ action meant 
to advocate the value of the tool was also symbolic. The data scientists presented the leads registered 
with the CLM code because it supported their argument. However, as acknowledged below, they 
avoided presenting the total sales performance per team and only benchmarked the registration data: 
If you just have four big customers that want to get all their mobile phone contracts with TelCo 
and you didn’t use the model but you’re just lucky, like I said, then you can have a small 
number of orders with very high revenues. So we do it [comparing with other sales metrics], 
but we don’t want to get it known, that’s all (data scientist). 
 
This symbolic advocacy enacted by the data scientists affected authority relationships: the data 
scientists gained influence in Sales Medium by putting pressure on the other sales teams to use the 
CLM model. These other account managers responded by following the example of their colleagues 
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in Kate’s team: registering sales leads with the CLM code without having actually used the CLM 
model to generate those leads: 
The data scientists want us to use the CLM and asked us ‘when you have a sales opportunity 
in CRM, just add the CLM code’. So everybody did it. So now it seems as if all the sales 
opportunities came from CLM, but in the real world, that’s not true. So everybody thought, 
when we sign the CLM code, we get rid of them, and then we don’t have the pressure... 
(account manager). 
 
Thus, the symbolic advocacy performed by the data scientists, made possible by the symbolic 
conformity initially enacted by Kate’s team, resulted in reinforcing the acts of symbolic conformity 
that were now performed by more account managers. This increased symbolic conformity also created 
actual consequences: more data accumulated in the CRM system, suggesting that the CLM model was 
widely used. Table 5 shows the registration numbers per sales team per quarter. The data scientists 
acted upon these data to strengthen the apparent effectiveness of the CLM model. They continued 
presenting the registration data to the sales teams at the kick-off meetings and celebrated the increase 
in the registration numbers as a success of the CLM model, to motivate the account managers to work 
more with it: 
The campaign manager opens the next slide named “Registration in the CRM system”. He 
explains that the account managers need to add the CLM code when registering leads to trace 
model usage. Then he presents the results of the registration and says ‘the numbers of won 
orders [marked with the CLM code] are much higher than before!’ He thanks the team. 
(fieldnotes from kick-off meeting). 
 
******** Insert Table 5 about here ********* 
However, this was also a symbolic advocacy action, since the data scientists continued to 
avoid investigating the veracity of those registration numbers and did not compare them with other 
data from the CRM system. This was highlighted by the Head of Customer Intelligence, after several 
quarters of benchmarking the registration numbers at the kick-off meetings: 
If there’s a lot of pressure to use this code, we should validate if this code is used this way, 
meaning that they’re not using it so they can say to their manager that they’ve been using the 
model. So we want to validate that at a later stage. I think somewhere in the fourth quarter [i.e. 
2013-Q4] (Head of Customer Intelligence). 
 
 Although account managers registered the use of the CLM code symbolically to defend their 
knowing practices, the regime of knowing was affected nonetheless. The data scientists were enabled 
to perform symbolic actions while advocating for the new technology, and were thus able to put more 
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pressure on the account managers, which had an effect on the authority arrangements. By making the 
CLM model appear to be an effective way of doing sales, this also affected the valuation scheme. 
Next to the registration of leads, the data scientists and account managers started adjusting 
their knowing practices. These adjustments were, again, of a symbolic nature. Acting upon the 
feedback collected in their meetings with the sales teams, the data scientists started adding extra fields 
to the output of the CLM model to meet the information needs of the account managers, such as more 
information about the duration of customers’ contracts. This action, however, was mainly performed 
symbolically, since the added changes were minimal and did not affect the algorithmic knowing 
practice that the CLM model represented. Instead of changing their algorithmic models based on the 
account managers’ feedback, the data scientists only added extra information fields to the spreadsheet, 
such as contract termination dates. Adding this information did not cost the data scientists much time 
or effort. However, it did show that the data scientists took the feedback from the account managers 
into consideration. The data scientists assumed that this extra information would trigger the account 
managers to use the spreadsheet with the CLM model output, because the account managers already 
used that same information in their everyday work, but up until then they had had to search for it in 
various other information systems. As one of the data scientists noted: 
Because for out-of-contract information, they [account managers] really have to look in the 
customer view mobile system, and have to apply all kind of filters… And for us it’s a piece of 
script [scripting language] and we can put it in… (data scientist). 
 
The data scientists’ symbolic advocacy action of updating the CLM model every quarter was 
materialized in the spreadsheets containing the model output. As expected by the data scientists, this 
triggered the account managers to open the spreadsheets more often to find the additional information 
more easily and use it in their work. By using the additional fields, the account managers could 
legitimately say that they were using the CLM spreadsheet and had a legitimate reason to register 
more leads in the CRM system with the CLM code. However, this was merely an act of symbolic 
conformity to maintain their knowing practices, as the account managers mainly just used the 
additional information, and continued not to use the predictions of the CLM model, which were 
supposed to be the main aspect that would change their way of working. They also continued to rely 
on direct contact with their customers as, for them, this was the most effective way of finding sales 
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opportunities. One account manager admitted his non-reliance on the CLM model: “mostly I don’t 
use it. I use it for certain facts, of course it’s nice to know when certain contracts terminate”. Another 
account manager acknowledged how little his knowing practices had changed: 
Because I speak with the client, and the client knows best what he wants and what he needs, 
and not just a system that says yeah, based on numbers, this is the potential. You have to speak 
to the client to really know what’s going on... So we’re using CLM just as support, that’s not 
what the client wants or is. It’s just a support. The true information comes from the customer 
himself... (account manager). 
 
In sum, in this period the account managers and data scientists performed mutual adjustments, 
but these mainly took symbolic forms. Table 4 shows how the symbolic conformity actions by the 
account managers triggered symbolic advocacy by the data scientists, and vice versa. The account 
managers enacted symbolic conformity and pretended to use the CLM by registering their sales leads 
into the CRM system, without actually using the CLM model. In addition, the data scientists 
advocated the changes associated with the CLM model via symbolic means. They pretended to 
modify the CLM model to make it more “useful” for sales, but did so with the trivial addition of 
“new” fields based on pre-existing model data. The account managers enacted symbolic conformity 
by using the improved model in the most basic way, so that they could maintain their knowing 
practices. They started using a small set of information from the model as support (e.g. contract 
termination dates), without changing their main way of working. Yet, all sides agreed that the CLM 
model was being used in Sales Medium. These symbolic actions had consequences for the regime of 
knowing. First, the valuation scheme was affected, since the CLM model became established as an 
effective way of doing sales. Second, the data scientists strengthened their authority, due to their 
involvement in managing the model and its data, and by customizing it to the needs of the account 
managers. Finally, as both groups seemed to engage more actively with the different knowing 
practices, it appeared as if there were positive developments on that aspect. Yet, account managers 
continued to rely on their traditional relationship-based knowing practices, while minimally 
interacting with the CLM model. 
Period of managerial intervention 
The period of limited mutual adjustments was followed by a period of managerial 
intervention, in which higher management intervened in the unfolding struggle over the regime of 
26 
knowing. Taking into consideration the power of higher management at TelCo, these interventions 
ended up being highly influential for the evolution of the regime of knowing in Sales Medium. It is, 
however, important to analyze how these interventions came about, and how the actions of the data 
scientists and account managers led to such managerial interventions (see Table 6 for a summary of 
the actions and their impact). 
******** Insert Table 6 about here ********* 
 As can be seen in Table 5, the number of leads registered with the CLM code by the account 
managers in the CRM system continued to increase. In January 2013, after a year of collecting these 
data, the data scientists presented the registration data to higher management, to show that the CLM 
model was effective. This was an important step for them, as they knew that once higher management 
started supporting the model, the account managers would have to comply and work with it fully. 
However, the data scientists were selective in the data they presented to higher management. Similar 
to the benchmarking of the registration numbers at the kick-off presentations, they avoided comparing 
the leads registered with the CLM code to other sales metrics. Thus, this was an act of symbolic 
advocacy by the data scientists, meant to increase their authority. As illustrated by the following quote 
from the Head of Sales, higher management was persuaded and began to support the data scientists to 
further integrate data analytics into sales: 
We need analytics far more than we use it right now… All that data and all the analytics makes 
the life of a sales person easier, so they can be more effective. And the company will not just 
have to assume that the sales person is doing their work properly. We’ll know it. So I think 
there’s a great benefit to putting far more energy on analytics than we do right now (Head of 
Sales). 
 
 From this point, higher management announced that all account managers had to work with 
the CLM model. This increased the pressure on the account managers, as the sales team managers had 
to commit their teams to actively use the CLM model. 
The Director of Marketing and Sales said ‘we must make that a way of working… I want every 
sales team to work with it, and do the right registration’. Then I organized all the sales team 
managers. We had a big meeting, they came to it, and we explained it. And they gave their 
commitment… We saw the progress of using the model as a standard way of working, but also 
the right registration in CRM… In the reviews, the sales team manager would talk about CLM 
with his account managers (Mike - campaign manager). 
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 Thus, symbolic advocacy by the data scientists, performed to gain the support of higher 
management by presenting them with the registration data, had a great impact on the regime of 
knowing: the data scientists gained more authority over the sales work and were able to put more 
pressure on the sales teams. Using their gained authority, the data scientists were also able to have an 
impact on the valuation scheme in Sales Medium: The CLM model became established as the 
legitimate way of working in Sales Medium. The data scientists also started pushing for the CLM 
model to become a tool for the sales team managers to evaluate the performance of their account 
managers. Ultimately, the data scientists’ symbolic advocacy action, originally intended to gain 
authority, also impacted the established knowing practices at Sales Medium, as the CLM model was 
included in the training of newly hired account managers. 
 These changes created a difficult environment for the account managers, as they experienced 
more pressure than ever to use the CLM model: 
At the beginning of 2013, a big rumble in the jungle... ‘Why don’t you use that, can you tell 
me why?’ And not only to me, but also to my other colleagues... You can chat with your sales 
team manager, but he has another way of thinking... He had to make people quiet, and he said 
‘I can get to my people, they have to fill that code in and I get no more questions’ (account 
manager). 
 
 The account managers realized that registering leads with the CLM code symbolically had 
worked against them. However, since they found it difficult to embrace the use of analytics in their 
work, they registered leads with the CLM code even more than before, in order to appear compliant 
with the changes and maintain their knowing practices: 
For every sales opportunity we had to put the CLM code in there… People did not use CLM, 
but put the code in... Excel management from the management. At headquarters they don’t 
want to hear that, in Region East, nobody uses the CLM… It’s political. Somebody took a lot 
of time to make the CLM model. Yeah, that’s a lot of money. [chuckles] Then you have to 
show that it works... (account manager). 
 
 Thus, by gaining management support with their symbolic advocacy action, the data scientists 
triggered the account managers to resort to further symbolic conformity. As can be seen in Table 5, 
over 2013 the numbers of leads registered with the CLM code increased exponentially, making the 
CLM model appear as if it was both widely used and effective. The data scientists celebrated the 
increase in registration numbers as a success, but stopped benchmarking the sales teams, as all teams 
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now registered leads with the CLM code. They did, however, continue to present their success to 
higher management, as indicated in the following excerpt from our fieldnotes: 
She also showed me a slide she has specifically about the CLM model. She said that she and 
Claire used such a slide every month to show to management and to higher management that 
the model is really working. On the top right there was a graph showing the number of leads 
and value of leads that have been registered in the funnel with the CLM code, for each month 
of 2013. It was an increasing line, which she said proved that the model had been used a lot. 
She told me that they couldn’t track which of the leads were transferred into orders 
(Observation of data analyst preparing a presentation for higher management). 
 
 Once the data scientists became more influential in sales work, after gaining the support of 
higher management, they used their newly gained authority to suggest more changes in the 
organizational structure and processes of the Sales department. Based on their data analyses, the Head 
of Customer Intelligence advised higher management, “how customers could be served more 
effectively and efficiently”. 
In February 2014, higher management announced a major reorganization in Sales Medium, 
which rendered the account managers redundant as of the end of 2014, and entailed outsourcing 
contact with customers to external sales organizations. Although this decision was driven by the need 
to reduce costs, as TelCo was facing problems in the rapidly changing telecoms industry, this 
reorganization announcement by higher management also had a symbolic dimension: Because the 
CLM model was now regarded as an effective way of working (a result of the symbolic conformity 
actions by the account managers and the symbolic advocacy actions by the data scientists), higher 
management framed the reorganization of Sales Medium as a shift by TelCo towards becoming more 
data-driven and efficient. This act of symbolic advocacy could be observed through the slides 
presented by higher management that gave the message that TelCo was increasing efficiency with the 
use of IT. This action was even perceived as symbolic by the Head of Customer Intelligence, as he 
explained in the following quote: 
In February we had this meeting, and there was this presentation by the Director of 
Marketing and Sales. And most of the slides contained ‘CLM model’, ‘CLM way of 
working’, because he saw it as ‘the way’… He told us ‘this is the way we are doing it, and 
this is going to make it all more efficient and effective’. But for them, and I’m very honest, 
it’s like something they can hook these things on. If they say ‘CLM model’, people believe 
it. But still, it’s just a strategic step in reducing costs and more IT oriented… it’s not all 
because of this CLM way of working (Head of Customer Intelligence). 
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The layoffs and outsourcing plans of the reorganization had a significant impact on the 
regime of knowing at Sales Medium. Acting efficiently based on data analytics became established as 
the appropriate way of working in Sales, which changed the valuation scheme from valuing 
information gained from close interaction with customers, to valuing information based on rational 
calculations. This change in the valuation scheme also enabled the data scientists to gain more 
authority and acquire a more central role in Sales Medium, as they played an active role in the 
reorganization process at TelCo’s Sales Medium, such as the reallocation of customers to new sales 
channels. The data scientists were also placed in charge of the task of identifying sales opportunities 
(with the CLM model) that would then be processed by agents in external sales organizations: 
But we also sort of do part of the work that the account manager used to do, because now we 
have to brainstorm which customers should be approached for which portfolio, which 
customers should be selected for the call centers… (data scientist). 
 
One account manager reflected on the radical changes in Sales Medium: 
The account managers are highly trained or have a lot of experience, so they’re not like a 
random street guy you could just put on the phone and just call, yeah? So, to me, it seemed 
like they said ‘OK, we’re just going to get random street guys, and they’re going to make 
phone calls based upon the CLM model, and because the CLM model has already proved itself, 
it’s going to be very successful!’ (account manager). 
 
 In sum, in this period the data scientists acted symbolically to gain managerial support and 
establish their authority in Sales Medium, enabled by the symbolic conformity of the account 
managers. This third period in which these reinforcing cycles of symbolic actions occurred (see also 
Table 6), resulted in establishing the CLM model as the legitimate way of working, thereby increasing 
the pressure on the account managers, who had to register their use of the CLM model symbolically in 
order to defend their knowing practices, whilst appearing compliant. Establishing the CLM model as 
an effective way of doing sales further supported higher management in framing a major 
reorganization, based on the valuation scheme of efficiency reflected in the CLM model. Through this 
reorganization, the account managers were no longer needed, while the data scientists established 
their authority in Sales Medium and radically changed the knowing practices. Clearly, the regime of 
knowing in Sales Medium had become fundamentally different from how it was before the 
introduction of the CLM model. 
DISCUSSION 
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In this field study of the sales function at TelCo, we have documented a radical change in the 
sales regime of knowing, from one focused on a deep understanding of customers via personal 
contacts and strong relationships, to one based upon model predictions from the processing of large 
population-wide and historical datasets. The introduction of data analytics was followed by a struggle 
over the regime of knowing between the data scientists and the account managers. The account 
managers found the predictive model to be incommensurate with their knowing practices and in 
contradiction with the established valuation schemes and authority arrangements. They resorted to 
symbolic conformity, for instance by designating personally-generated sales leads as coming from the 
analytics model. In turn, the data scientists resorted to symbolic advocacy; for example, they 
presented the increase in registered sales leads as evidence of the model’s effectiveness. For 
management, this apparent success of the predictive model confirmed the superiority of the new way 
of working and led to the layoff of most of the account managers. We find that this dance of symbolic 
conformity and advocacy did, ironically, accelerate this radical change in the regime of knowing. 
A regime-of-knowing perspective on technology-related organizational change 
As the bidirectional arrows show in the model in Figure 2, the three aspects of the regime of 
knowing (knowing practices, valuation schemes, and authority arrangements) are intertwined in such 
a way that change in one is coupled with a change in the other two. Our findings indicate that these 
dynamics of change in one aspect influencing change in other aspects recurred in each of the three 
periods, each time spurred on by cycles of symbolic actions, ultimately leading to change in the whole 
regime of knowing. For example, in the TelCo case, before the introduction of the CLM model, the 
original knowing practices related to understanding customers through personal contact were coherent 
with the valuation scheme of forming deep relationships, and with account managers having authority 
over how to approach their customers. Thus, changes in the valuation scheme and authority 
arrangements eventually led to contemporaneous changes in the knowing practices.  
The interconnection between the aspects of a regime of knowing is important and has 
implications for change. We found that the incumbent workers whose work was affected by the 
technological change (i.e. the account managers) performed symbolic conformity in order to defend 
their knowing practices and to avoid real change. However, symbolic conformity enabled the 
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technologists who introduced the new technology (i.e. the data scientists) to perform symbolic 
advocacy. The technologists performed symbolic advocacy with the intention to change all aspects of 
the regime of knowing. They targeted the valuation scheme throughout all three time periods; the 
knowing practices in particular during the second period; and the authority arrangements during the 
last period. Thus, whereas the incumbent workers only defended their knowing practices, the 
technologists addressed all three aspects of the regime of knowing. Moreover, symbolic advocacy to 
target one aspect of the regime, had ripple effects and resulted in changing the other two aspects as 
well (since all three are intertwined). Thus, by triggering symbolic advocacy, symbolic conformity 
aimed to maintain the knowing practices inadvertently contributed to changing the valuation scheme 
and the authority arrangements, and through those aspects, ultimately also changing the knowing 
practices. 
Because actors tend to act within a regime of knowing unreflectively, they are usually 
unaware of how the aspects of the regime are intertwined. In fact, when actors focus on only one 
aspect of the regime of knowing, they may overlook changes taking place in other aspects, which 
could lead to unexpected consequences. For example, in our case, the account managers conformed 
symbolically to defend their knowing practices, focusing on resolving the practical challenges posed 
to them with the introduction of the data analytics technology. They were so engaged in the 
established regime that they could not conceive that the new approach could ever turn out to be a 
superior way of working. Thus, they overlooked the more fundamental and deeper challenges related 
to the valuation scheme and the authority arrangements. They enacted symbolic conformity to sustain 
their knowing practices, without realizing that, in this way, they had opened the door for the data 
scientists’ symbolic advocacy tactics, which focused on all three aspects of the regime of knowing. 
By using symbolic advocacy, the data scientists managed to increase the value of the CLM model 
within TelCo and gain support from management. This eventually granted them authority, enabling 
them to push for fundamental changes in the knowing practices, and thereby radically transforming 
the regime of knowing. 
Taking a regime-of-knowing lens illuminates why and how actors may resort to symbolic 
actions during technology introduction. Our findings suggest that symbolic conformity was a way for 
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the incumbent workers who were affected by the technological change (i.e. the account managers) to 
sustain their knowing practices since they did not have sufficient power to resist implementation 
efforts by the technologists who introduced the new technology. Technologists may engage in 
symbolic advocacy in order to gain legitimacy and support from management and other stakeholders. 
In our case, symbolic advocacy involved promoting the effectiveness gains associated with the model-
based ways of working. These actions were performed behind the scenes or indirectly to management. 
When both incumbent workers and technologists resorted to symbolic action, their distinct sets of 
symbolic actions reinforced each other and, thus, ironically became an important mechanism for 
accelerating the evolution of the regime of knowing. This was illustrated in the recursive relationship 
between symbolic advocacy and conformity in Figure 2. Both types of symbolic actions had a 
material component: what data were entered, how they were processed, and how they were deployed 
became areas of symbolic struggle. Thus, symbolic conformity, enacted through the apparently 
innocuous move by account managers of ‘ticking the box’ when registering leads in the CRM system, 
ultimately had dire consequences. The data scientists used the entered data to ‘objectively’ 
demonstrate the success of the CLM model to stakeholders and therefore affected the valuation 
scheme and authority arrangements. This resulted in increased pressure on the account managers to 
conform. These reinforcing cycles of symbolic conformity and symbolic advocacy affected aspects of 
the regime of knowing in unintended ways and with ironic consequences. 
Like in all qualitative studies, certain boundary conditions influenced the occurrence of these 
dynamics and may limit their generalizability. First, neither the account managers nor the data 
scientists had deciding authority over the Sales Medium function and thus could not impose their 
version of the regime of knowing. The lack of managerial intervention in the initial stages of the 
introduction of the CLM technology was also an important factor that triggered the struggle over the 
regime of knowing. If management had been involved from the start, the actors might have tried to 
engage with each other more substantively, rather than merely acting symbolically, and the regime of 
knowing might have evolved differently. Another boundary condition is the complexity and scale of 
the sale. In the TelCo case, the account managers who served large-sized enterprises were able to 
decline the introduction of the model because their deep engagement with their customers was 
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economically crucial and too consequential to unsettle. Finally, the process of integrating the 
technologists into the sales function may have been highly consequential for the dynamics that 
emerged. If the data scientists had been collocated or paired with members of the sales teams, they 
may have engaged more genuinely with the account managers. Instead, they were allowed to remain 
separate and this led to the polarization of differences. 
Theoretical implications 
The regime-of-knowing lens that this study advances offers a new way to approach and 
understand the introduction of new technology in the workplace. Literature has shown that technology 
introduction can be highly problematic when it is associated with novel and unfamiliar practices that 
challenge how actors construct and use knowledge (e.g., Bailey et al. 2012; Barley 1986; Barrett et al. 
2012; Zuboff 1988). The regime-of-knowing perspective views knowing practices as entwined with 
valuation schemes and authority arrangements. This helps researchers see below the surface of 
struggles over changing established practices and understand the deeper challenges that actors are 
faced with, such as disputing what is worth knowing, what actions matter to acquire this knowledge, 
and who has the authority to make decisions around those issues.  
The regime-of-knowing perspective is useful to better understand the power dynamics around 
the integration of novel knowing practices with the introduction of technology. Incorporating new 
ways of knowing brings new power asymmetries by challenging who knows, who decides who 
knows, and who decides who decides (Zuboff 2019). The relative authority of actors is often a 
decisive factor in determining the outcomes of such power struggles (Anthony 2018; Barley 1990; 
Markus 1983; Noble 1984). However, the dynamics and outcomes of such conflicts are difficult to 
predict if none of the actors involved have full authority over the work domain. In those cases, the 
actors draw upon aspects of the regime of knowing to affect the power struggle. For example, in our 
case, the technologists (i.e. the data scientists) tried to act upon the valuation scheme in order to 
trigger management to take a stance, eventually having an impact on the authority arrangements and 
enforcing changes in the knowing practices. 
When studying organizational or work changes that come about with the introduction of a 
new technology, the regime-of-knowing perspective can be an alternative to technological 
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deterministic explanations. This perspective acknowledges that technology introduction can be 
associated with new ways of engaging with the world and novel approaches to the production of 
knowledge (Galison 1997; Knorr-Cetina 1999; Zuboff 2019). Yet, changes in knowing practices are 
not just tied to a new technology as if that were an external deterministic force, nor do they result 
from a planned implementation program. Instead, they are shaped by how the actors engage in the 
emerging struggles (Bailey and Leonardi 2015; Kraemer et al. 1987; Noble 1984; Zuboff 1988). 
Using a regime-of-knowing lens deepens our understanding of how such struggles unfold. Our study 
reveals that contests over the transformation of existing knowing practices can unfold behind the 
scenes through a series of symbolic actions.  
Advancing a regime-of-knowing lens has also helped us understand why changes in knowing 
practices may emerge as unintended outcomes of those symbolic actions. Actors may resort to 
symbolic conformity to deal with the inconsistencies between a newly introduced technology and 
work practices (Azad and King 2008; Berente and Yoo 2012; Berente et al. 2016; Christin 2017). Or 
actors may engage in symbolic advocacy to gain legitimacy and support over the suggested changes 
from internal and external stakeholders (Brown 1994; 1995). Such symbolic actions are highly 
consequential, especially because of their reinforcing dynamics. As actors tend to operate within a 
regime of knowing almost unreflectively, they may act symbolically by focusing on one aspect of the 
regime, without realizing that this could enable or reinforce symbolic actions oriented to the other two 
aspects. Thus, whereas symbolic actions are generally viewed as a safety valve to maintain actors’ 
idiosyncratic ways of working (Hallett 2010; Oliver 1991), our study offers a different view according 
to which symbolic actions may work against the actors’ intentions and yield dramatic consequences 
that extend beyond their control. For example, symbolic conformity may result in various ironic 
outcomes, such as damaging the very same actors who conform symbolically, or even luring 
management to perform radical changes without any real evidence that the new knowing practices are 
more effective than the old ones. 
This study also contributes to the emergent literature on regimes of knowing by showing how 
transformation of a regime of knowing takes place. Regimes of knowledge have been demonstrated to 
be a useful framework to make sense of clashes over pragmatic differences (Howard-Grenville and 
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Carlile 2006). When encountering radical work changes, actors draw upon well-established 
conventions regarding what are good ways of acting to establish the legitimacy of their claims 
(Cloutier and Langley 2013; Patriotta et al. 2011; Thévenot 2001). Shifting the attention to knowing 
and to a processual, dynamic view of regimes has proven useful to explain how radical change in 
ways of working takes place, and how the interactions of the actors involved affect this change 
process. 
Finally, the emergence of new algorithmic technologies, such as data analytics, deep learning, 
and robotics that are increasingly permeating almost every process in nearly every type of 
organizational setting, is making the regime-of-knowing lens more necessary than ever. Such 
technologies generate insight, classifications, or predictions that resemble those of a knowledge 
worker (Faraj et al. 2018). They are associated with paradigms that challenge what counts as valuable 
information and how it is produced (boyd and Crawford 2012). They impose deep changes on existing 
organizational members’ ways of working that may be difficult to embrace (Anthony 2018). Thus, 
technologies can pose an existential threat to the knowledge workforce and implicate radical changes 
in forms of organizing (Zuboff 2019). The regime-of-knowing lens helps shed light on the deeper 
challenges arising from the emergence of algorithmic technologies, related not only with how we 
know, but also with which ways of knowing are more valuable and who determines that. Thus, the 
regime-of-knowing perspective can be a useful tool in the quest for answering research questions 
related to how such emerging technologies influence attitudes and behaviors in the workplace, how 
they affect power structures, and how they become associated with altered work content and 
processes. 
Conclusions 
Triggered by observations of ironic consequences of symbolic conformity during the 
introduction of new technology, we have used a regime-of-knowing lens to explain how struggles 
unfold when actors are faced with changes in the established ways of working. We found that 
knowing practices are highly intertwined with deeper assumptions about which way of knowing is 
superior, or who has authority to make decisions about how knowledge should be obtained. Thus, a 
regime-of-knowing lens facilitates the study of the actions that take place below the surface of a 
36 
struggle over incommensurate ways of knowing, and helps explain how radical transformation of 
knowing practices may happen through the reinforcing dynamics of symbolic actions. 
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Table 1 The regime of knowing in Sales Medium 
Regime of knowing in Sales Medium before the introduction of the 
CLM model (2012) 
Focus on relationship-based knowing 
Regime of knowing in Sales Medium after the reorganization (2015) 
Focus on algorithmic knowing 
Knowing practice: 
Generating highly contextualized knowledge based on personal contact with the 
customer, using intuition and experience. 
 
Representative quote: 
“Most times people say that account managers are people who talk a lot, but it’s 
the opposite. Good account managers are people who listen very carefully, ask the 
good questions the right way, feel when a customer needs something, and back off 
when he doesn’t want to... It’s just listening carefully to what the customer is 
saying...” 
Knowing practice: 
Generating knowledge through algorithmic processing of large datasets 
consisting of factual data that is stored in accessible databases. 
 
Representative quote: 
“Yeah, but you can also do it for acquisition. You can order all these potentials -
so you have a potential for acquisition, potential for churn, and potential for cross 
sell, and the highest potential is on top. And when you see that this customer has, 
for instance, a high probability for cross selling, and the potential is large, then 
perhaps you can put this certain phase on sell...” 
Valuation scheme: 
Having a personal and trustworthy relationship with the customer is important to 
perform well in sales. 
 
Representative quote: 
“I’m a ‘farmer’… I want to know my client, and after a while, I’m a strong 
believer that when you know a client and they know you, and they know they can 
trust you, you get a lot more business from it. So, for me it’s very important to 
know my customers, and that they know who I am, and that they can find me, and 
that they know I am the one who solves everything for them.” 
Valuation scheme: 
You need to act rationally and as efficiently as possible. Acting based on the 
algorithmic outcome is more rational and efficient. 
Representative quote: 
“Sometimes I just say ‘OK, you shouldn’t target those people, because chances 
are low that they will respond. They don’t want that product, we see that based 
on the models.’ They are like ‘Yeah... but our target is that we just have to get as 
many new customers as we want and I now have some budget, so I’m just going 
to do this campaign anyway.’ OK, but it’s not as efficient as they could have 
been. Basically, I’m just saying this to them and hope they act in the way I would 
like.” 
Authority arrangement: 
The sales process should be controlled by the account manager because s/he is in 
contact with the customer. This includes interfering with closing of the deal. 
 
Representative quote: 
“Because it’s my customer, and I have my own customers, it’s my own set, and it’s 
my responsibility, it’s my work to make it a commercially attractive company for 
<TelCo>. So, then I’d rather hear it for myself, and try to adjust that feeling from 
the customer, by maybe helping him with some things, and by making myself a 
trustworthy advisor.” 
Authority arrangement: 
The task of identifying sales opportunities should be separated from the act of 
calling the client. The role of the data scientist is important because s/he develops 
analytical insights for organizing the sales work. The role of the account manager 
is reduced to that of a caller. 
 
Representative quote: 
“I’m not only a provider of data and insights. I want to be actively involved in 
sales. OK, they need information, but how can I help them to also get towards an 
answer to the questions they have? Because just providing the information is still 
not an answer. You have to process it and you have to change the way in which 
they come up with an action.” 
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Table 2 Overview of collected data 
Type of 
data 
Type of informants Number Total time 
Interviews Account managers from Sales Medium 30 interviews 28.4 hours 
Data scientists 17 interviews 15 hours 
Fired account managers from Sales Medium 3 interviews 2.2 hours 
Account managers from other sales channels  17 interviews 16.8 hours 
Sales team managers from Sales Medium 5 interviews 5.2 hours 
Campaign manager 2 interviews 2 hours 
Marketers 2 interviews 2.3 hours 
Sales directors 2 interviews 1.1 hours 
Observations 
(shadowing) 
Account managers from Sales Medium 3 days of observations (shadowing) 24.5 hours 
Data scientists 8 days of observations (shadowing) 51 hours 
Observations 
of meetings 
Kick-off presentations from data scientists and campaign manager to account managers and sales 
team managers 
3 meetings observed 3.2 hours 
Weekly meetings of the data scientists' team 7 meetings observed 6.5 hours 
Unofficial 
meetings 
Data scientists 15 meetings with data scientists and 





Based on interactions with all respondents - - 
Documents Internal documents 43 documents - 
Documents Public documents 23 documents - 
Documents News 9 documents - 
Total number of interviews: 78 Total recorded time: 73 hours 
Total number of observations: 21 Total time of observing: 85.2 hours 
Total number of documents: 75 
 
Table 3 Actions performed during the period of attempted collaboration and their impact on the regime of knowing 
Action 
Label 




Consequence Impact on the 
regime of knowing 
DS1 Data scientists team up with the campaign 
manager and participate in regular meetings that 







faced at the 
first 
meeting. 
The data scientists gain regular access to the sales teams. 
This triggers symbolic action AM 1, because account 
managers are expected to participate in those meetings. 




AM1 Account managers attend meetings 
symbolically. 
 
Symbolic conformity:  
Finding no use in the presentations, but aiming 




DS1 Data scientists gain presence in Sales Medium. 
This enables symbolic action DS2. 
cannot ignore the 
data scientists. 
DS2 Data scientists frame the model as a supportive 
tool, rather than a mandatory change. 
 
Symbolic advocacy:  
Aiming to change the current way of working, 





AM1 The CLM model becomes known as an alternative way of 
finding sales opportunities. 
This triggers account managers to reflect on the usefulness of 
the CLM model and provide an explanation (AM2) rather than 
simply ignore. 
Impact on valuation 
scheme: Two 
competing sets of 
assumptions for how 
sales work should be 
done. 
AM2 Account managers explain their views about 




DS2 This triggers the data scientists to explain how the CLM 
model works (DS3) to motivate the account managers to use 
it. 
It also informs the data scientists’ action to track the use of the 
CLM model to prove its effectiveness (DS4). 
DS3 Data scientists discuss the model's inner 






This initiates a conversation with the account managers, who 
reflect on the CLM model and provide feedback (AM3). 
Impact on knowing 
practices: Acting 
upon the analytics 
becomes a known 
practice. 






This informs the data scientists about ways to adapt the CLM 
model so that the account managers find it useful (DS7). 
 
Table 4 Actions performed during the period of limited mutual adjustment and their impact on the regime of knowing 
Action 
Label 




Consequence Impact on the 
regime of knowing 
DS4 Data scientists ask account managers to register leads 







This triggers account managers to register symbolically, as 
their team manager wants them to support the CLM model, 
but they do not want to change their knowing practices 
(AM4).  
Impact on valuation 
scheme: 
The CLM model 
appears to work for 
some. 
AM4 Account managers in Kate's team start registering 






DS4 Data in CRM system indicate that the CLM model is used 
by some account managers.  
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Pretending to use the CLM model while performing 
own knowing practices. 
This enables the data scientists to show that the CLM model 
is being used by some (DS5, DS6, DS8). 
DS5 Data scientists benchmark registration numbers. 
 
Symbolic advocacy: 
Avoiding comparison with other sales metrics to 





AM4 Registration numbers in the presentation slides make early 
adopters appear as champions. 
 
This triggers more symbolic registration (AM5). 
 
Impact on valuation 
scheme: 
The CLM model 
appears to be an 
effective way of 
working. 
 





achieving to put 
pressure on account 
managers. 
AM5 Account managers register leads with the CLM code 
symbolically. 
 
Symbolic conformity:  
Pretending to use the CLM model while performing 




DS5 More data accumulated in the CRM system indicating that 
the CLM model is used. 
 
This enables the data scientists to show that their model is 
successfully used (DS6, DS8). 
DS6 Data scientists celebrate increase in registration 
numbers as success of model use. 
 
Symbolic advocacy:  
Avoiding thorough analysis of registration numbers 







Benchmarking the registration numbers at presentations 
triggers account managers to register more (AM5). 
 
DS7 Data scientists update the CLM model output with 
additional information fields. 
 
Symbolic advocacy:  
Avoiding changing the algorithmic models, doing 






AM3 The updates trigger the account managers to open the tool to 
easily find information (AM6). 
Impact on knowing 
practices: 
Both groups engage 
more actively with 
the different knowing 
practices. 





This legitimizes the registration of leads with the CLM code 
(AM7). 
AM7 Account managers register leads with the CLM code, 
as they use the additional fields. 
 
Symbolic conformity:  
Appearing to act upon the predictions, while only 
using the additional fields and relying on direct 




DS7 Triggering more registration of leads with the CLM code, 
even though the predictions are not used. This also enables 
the data scientists to celebrate the success of the CLM model 
(DS6, DS8). 
Impact on valuation 
scheme: 
The CLM model is 




Table 5: Number of leads registered with the CLM code in the CRM system 




2012 Q4 2012 Q1 2013 
Q2 
2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013 
Healthcare 3 0 176 46 
No benchmarking amongst 
sales teams. Only the total 
number of leads was tracked 
and presented at the kick-off 
meetings. 
East 1 9 24 122 56 
East 2 0 28 95 116 
East 3 4 7 111 30 
West 1 4 0 269 63 
West 2 0 0 167 69 
West 3 0 100 106 148 
South 1 
(Kate) 286 637 1455 1396 
South 2 6 22 393 127 
South 3 9 5 1085 360 
Total 321 823 3979 2411 13180 11418 24306 15955 
 
 
Table 6 Actions performed during the period of managerial intervention and their impact on the regime of knowing 
Action 
Label 




Consequence of symbolic action 
Impact on the regime of knowing 
DS8 Data scientists present registration data to higher 
management. 
 
Symbolic advocacy:  
Presenting without having checked whether 







Convincing management to support the data 
scientists (MG1). 
Impact on valuation scheme: 
The CLM model becomes the 
legitimate way of working in Sales 
and becomes part of the evaluation of 
sales work. 
 
Impact on knowing practices: 
The CLM model becomes part of the 
training for new account managers. 
 
Impact on authority arrangements: 
The data scientists have support from 
higher management to affect the 
work in Sales more directly and 
MG1 Higher management supports the CLM model and 




DS8 This encourages the data scientists to try to 
expand the influence of the CLM mode, e.g. by 
making it an evaluation tool (DS9), or by 
suggesting changes in Sales Medium (DS10). 
It also increases the pressure for the account 
managers and triggers more symbolic 
registration (AM8).  
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DS9 Data scientists make the CLM model a tool for 





MG1 This indicates that the data scientists had 
sufficient authority to impact how Sales 
Medium was organized. It also shows that the 
CLM model was now the legitimate way of 
working. It resulted in increasing the pressure 
on the account managers and triggering more 
symbolic conformity (AM8). 
increase pressure on account 
managers. 
AM8 Account managers increase the symbolic 
registration of leads with the CLM code. 
 
Symbolic conformity:  
Pretending to use the CLM model while performing 
own knowing practices, to appear compliant and 






Data in the CRM system show a success story, 
making the CLM model appear as if it is widely 
used and effective. This later informs higher 
management to frame the reorganization as a 
change towards making sales more data-driven 
and efficient (MG3). 
DS10 Data scientists suggest changes based on data 
analyses to higher management to make the Sales 





MG1 This informs higher management’s decision to 
reorganize the Sales Medium (MG2) and to 
frame the reorganization as a change towards 
making sales mode data-driven and efficient 
(MG3). 
Impact on valuation scheme: 
Acting efficiently based on data 
analytics becomes established as the 
appropriate way of working in Sales 
Medium. 
 
Impact on knowing practices: 
The CLM model becomes the main 
tool for communicating sales 
opportunities to the external sales 
organizations. 
 
Impact on authority arrangements: 
The data scientists gain authority 
over the task of finding sales 
opportunities and increase their 
overall authority in Sales Medium. 
The account managers lose all of 
their control as they get fired. 
MG2 Higher management reorganizes the Sales Medium 











This has a direct impact on the knowing 
practices in Sales Medium as it ceases the 
practices performed by the account managers. It 
also entails more involvement of the data 
scientists in customer allocation (DS11). 
MG3 Higher management frames the reorganization as 
becoming more data-driven and efficient. 
 
Symbolic advocacy:  









The CLM model is mentioned in all 
presentation slides; the data scientists gain a 
more central role in Sales Medium and thus 
have the legitimacy to get more involved in the 
reorganization (DS11). 
DS11 Data scientists get involved in the reorganization of 








This indicates that the knowing practices are 
now radically changed, and that the data 
scientists have expanded their authority over 
sales tasks. 
 
 
